Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Côte d’Ivoire has entered a renewed period of extreme political instability following a contested presidential election designed to cap an often forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at reunifying Côte d’Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002. In the past week, a renewed rebel offensive captured key towns in western and central Côte d’Ivoire, including the administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, and there was intense fighting in Abidjan, the commercial capital and government stronghold. On April 4, French forces seized control of the Abidjan airport, and French troops and international peacekeepers fired on government targets. These actions were defended as necessary to enable evacuations of foreigners and the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.
The renewed conflict directly threatens long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d’Ivoire. Indirectly at stake are broader, long-term U.S. efforts and billions of dollars in assistance to ensure regional stability, peace, democratic and accountable governance, and economic growth in West Africa. The United States has supported the Ivoirian peace process, both diplomatically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); funded a UNOCI predecessor, the U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire; and assisted in the deployment in 2003 of a now defunct Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force. The 112th Congress may be asked to consider additional funding for UNOCI; U.S. support for a potential ECOWAS military intervention force; or new funding for emergency humanitarian aid in response to the deteriorating political-military situation.
On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two leading winners of a first-round poll a month earlier. Both claim to have won the runoff and separately inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara bases his victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). These show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, endorsed the IECannounced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. Gbagbo, rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo therefore claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to Ouattara.
The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in violence, human rights abuses, and attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has broadly rejected Gbagbo’s victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president. It is using diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. H.Res. 85 (Payne), introduced on February 10, 2011, would express congressional support for such ends. Top U.S officials have also attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down. An existing U.S. ban on bilateral aid was augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo administration. As of early 2011, regional mediation had produced few results; non-military efforts may be superseded by the rebels’ renewed attempt to oust Gbagbo by force. Continued political volatility was likely under most current scenarios. A unity government might temporarily reduce political tension, but would likely not resolve the root causes of the crisis.
Date of Report: April 5, 2011
Number of Pages: 79
Order Number: RS21989
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Specialist in African Affairs
Côte d’Ivoire has entered a renewed period of extreme political instability following a contested presidential election designed to cap an often forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at reunifying Côte d’Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002. In the past week, a renewed rebel offensive captured key towns in western and central Côte d’Ivoire, including the administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, and there was intense fighting in Abidjan, the commercial capital and government stronghold. On April 4, French forces seized control of the Abidjan airport, and French troops and international peacekeepers fired on government targets. These actions were defended as necessary to enable evacuations of foreigners and the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.
The renewed conflict directly threatens long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d’Ivoire. Indirectly at stake are broader, long-term U.S. efforts and billions of dollars in assistance to ensure regional stability, peace, democratic and accountable governance, and economic growth in West Africa. The United States has supported the Ivoirian peace process, both diplomatically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); funded a UNOCI predecessor, the U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire; and assisted in the deployment in 2003 of a now defunct Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force. The 112th Congress may be asked to consider additional funding for UNOCI; U.S. support for a potential ECOWAS military intervention force; or new funding for emergency humanitarian aid in response to the deteriorating political-military situation.
On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two leading winners of a first-round poll a month earlier. Both claim to have won the runoff and separately inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara bases his victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). These show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, endorsed the IECannounced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. Gbagbo, rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo therefore claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to Ouattara.
The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in violence, human rights abuses, and attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has broadly rejected Gbagbo’s victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president. It is using diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. H.Res. 85 (Payne), introduced on February 10, 2011, would express congressional support for such ends. Top U.S officials have also attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down. An existing U.S. ban on bilateral aid was augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo administration. As of early 2011, regional mediation had produced few results; non-military efforts may be superseded by the rebels’ renewed attempt to oust Gbagbo by force. Continued political volatility was likely under most current scenarios. A unity government might temporarily reduce political tension, but would likely not resolve the root causes of the crisis.
Date of Report: April 5, 2011
Number of Pages: 79
Order Number: RS21989
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Posts
