Western Sahara

Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs

Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied, at times violently, for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. In 1991, the United Nations (U.N.) arranged a ceasefire and proposed a settlement plan calling for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and later called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered a plan for increased regional autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Polisario offered as a counter-proposal a referendum of self-determination, as had been supported by the U.N. Security Council. The Moroccan government and the Polisario have met under U.N. auspices since 2007, but have made no progress on a settlement due to an apparent unwillingness to compromise. The Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General on Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, a U.S. diplomat, has convened informal talks and—more recently—proposed shuttle diplomacy between Morocco and the Polisario. International attention to the stalemate appears to be increasing amid growing concerns over regional security threats.

Morocco controls roughly 80% of the disputed territory and considers the whole area part of its sovereign territory. In line with his autonomy initiative, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI has pursued policies of decentralization that he says are intended to empower residents of his Saharan provinces. The Polisario has a government in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is hosted and backed by neighboring Algeria. The Western Sahara issue has stymied Moroccan-Algerian bilateral relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union, and regional cooperation on economic and security issues.

The United States has not recognized the SADR or Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The United States supports the U.N. mediation effort, has referred to the Moroccan autonomy proposal as “serious, realistic, and credible,” and has urged the parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution—an outcome that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. The United States contributes funds, but no manpower, to the U.N. Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). MINURSO was initially focused on organizing a referendum, but its role now is to monitor the 1991 cease-fire. Human rights advocates and some diplomats support mandating MINURSO to monitor human rights, but Morocco is adamantly opposed, and portrays such proposals as an affront to its sovereignty.

Morocco and the Polisario, and advocates on both sides, regularly appeal to Congress to support their positions. Some Members of Congress support an independence referendum and are frustrated by delays, while many others support Morocco’s position. Congressional concerns over human rights conditions in Western Sahara have periodically been expressed in foreign aid appropriations legislation, including in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112- 74), as amended and extended via continuing resolutions. The conference report on P.L. 112-74 separately states that bilateral economic aid for Morocco “may be used in regions and territories administered by Morocco,” an apparent reference to Western Sahara. It has been U.S. policy that funds for Morocco may not be used in Western Sahara, as this would tacitly accept Moroccan sovereignty. See also CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues, by Alexis Arieff.


Date of Report: April 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 15
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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Lauren Ploch
Specialist in African Affairs

The U.S. government considers its relationship with Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and its second largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with more than 170 million people, roughly divided between Muslims and Christians. U.S. diplomatic relations with Nigeria, which is regularly among the top six suppliers of U.S. oil imports, have improved since the country made the transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, and Nigeria is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is an influential actor in African politics, having mediated disputes in several African countries and ranking among the top five troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security challenges that have the potential to threaten the stability of both the state and the region, and to affect global oil prices. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the authority and legitimacy of the state. Despite its extensive oil and natural gas resources, Nigeria’s human development indicators are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty. Years of social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production and impeded the southern region’s economic development. Perceived neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the predominately Muslim north. Thousands have been killed in periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade.

The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian in December 2009 and the ri of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, have heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world’s largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has increasingly targeted churches, triggering some retaliatory violence and threatening to inflame religious tensions in Nigeria. While the group remains primarily focused on a domestic agenda, some of its members appear to have expanded ties with other violent Islamist groups, namely those operating in Mali and the Sahel, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Nigeria deployed troops to Mali in 2013 as part of a U.N.-authorized African-led military operation. Ansaru, a Boko Haram splinter group, appears intent on kidnapping foreigners.

Nigeria’s last elections, in 2011, were viewed by many as a key test of the government’s commitment to democracy. The U.S. government had deemed previous elections to be deeply flawed. Election observers described the 2011 polls as a significant improvement over previous efforts, but not without problems. Post-election protests and violence across the north highlighted communal tensions, grievances, and mistrust of the government in that region. President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, was reelected and faces multiple, sometimes competing pressures to implement reforms to address Nigeria’s security and development challenges.

The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigerian reform initiatives, including anticorruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern. Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments, and some Members have expressed concern with corruption, human rights abuses, environmental damage from oil drilling, and the threat of violent extremism in Nigeria. Congress oversees more than $600 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria—one of the largest U.S. bilateral assistance packages in Africa.


Date of Report: April 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 26
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Western Sahara

Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs

Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied, at times violently, for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. In 1991, the United Nations (U.N.) arranged a ceasefire and proposed a settlement plan that called for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and later called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered a plan for increased regional autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Moroccan government and the Polisario have met under U.N. auspices since 2007, but have made no progress on a settlement due to an apparent unwillingness to compromise. U.N. Special Envoy Christopher Ross, a U.S. diplomat, has convened informal talks and—more recently—initiated shuttle diplomacy between Morocco, the Polisario, and regional and European leaders.

Morocco controls roughly 80% of the disputed territory and considers the whole area part of its sovereign territory. In line with his autonomy initiative, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI has pursued policies of decentralization that he says are intended to empower residents of his Saharan provinces. The Polisario has a government in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is hosted and backed by neighboring Algeria. The Western Sahara issue has stymied Moroccan-Algerian bilateral relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union, and regional cooperation on economic and security issues. International attention to the issue appears to have increased over the past year amid growing concerns over regional terrorist threats.

The United States has not recognized the SADR or Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The United States has supported the U.N. mediation effort, has referred to the Moroccan autonomy proposal as “serious, realistic, and credible,” and has urged the parties to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution—an outcome that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. The United States contributes funds, but no manpower, to the U.N. Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). MINURSO was initially focused on organizing a referendum, but its role now is to monitor the 1991 cease-fire. MINURSO’s current mandate expires on April 30, 2013. The U.N. Secretary-General recently urged diplomats to focus on resolving the Western Sahara issue because the standoff is impeding international responses to growing security threats in the region. The Secretary-General also recommended including human rights monitoring in MINURSO’s mandate, which Morocco adamantly opposes.

Morocco and the Polisario, and advocates on both sides, regularly appeal to Congress to support their positions. Some Members of Congress support an independence referendum and are frustrated by delays, while others support Morocco’s position and the autonomy initiative. Congress has periodically required executive branch reporting on human rights in Western Sahara as a condition for allocating certain security assistance for Morocco, including in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74), as amended and extended via continuing resolutions. The conference report on P.L. 112-74 states that bilateral economic aid for Morocco “may be used in regions and territories administered by Morocco,” an apparent reference to the Western Sahara. It has been U.S. policy that funds for Morocco may not be used for programming in Western Sahara, as this would tacitly accept Moroccan sovereignty. See also CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues, by Alexis Arieff.


Date of Report: April 14, 2013
Number of Pages: 14
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Malawi: Recent Developments and U.S. Relations

Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs

President Barack Obama’s Administration and a number of Members of Congress welcomed Malawian President Joyce Banda’s accession to power, largely because she reversed a number of contentious decisions taken by her predecessor, Bingu wa Mutharika. Banda succeeded him after he died in early April 2012 while serving a contentious second term. Banda’s status as Africa’s second female president, an internationally recognized women’s rights advocate, and a leader with socioeconomic development expertise has also attracted U.S. and other international support for her. There are some indications that Banda may pursue a foreign policy aligned with selected U.S. regional policy goals, and in March 2013, President Obama invited Banda to the White House to discuss democratic strengthening, trade, and investment. In August 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Malawi to discuss economic and governance reforms and to highlight U.S.-funded development projects. In September 2012 Banda addressed a gathering of Members of Congress at a forum on U.S.-Malawian and broader U.S.-African relations.

Malawi, a former British colony, is a small, poor southeastern African country that underwent a democratic transition from one-party rule in the early 1990s and has long relied on donor aid. Under Mutharika, however, Malawi’s ties with donors had been damaged over concerns related to economic management, undemocratic governance trends, and Mutharika’s acrimonious stance toward donors. Upon taking office, Banda—who had served as Mutharika’s vice president and therefore succeeded him upon his death—initiated a series of economic and governance reform efforts, seeking to reverse changes made under Mutharika. In response, most donors that had suspended aid under Mutharika reinstated it, a welcome prospect for Malawi’s flagging economy. Such reinstated aid included a U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact.

Key donor-backed policy changes made by Banda have included a devaluation of the national currency, the kwacha, and efforts to repeal several controversial civil and political rights laws passed under Mutharika. She also set out a number of policies designed to spur socioeconomic development and growth, gender equality, and respect for human rights, and supported fiscal austerity measures, including budget cuts affecting the presidency. Banda faces interlinked economic and political challenges arising from her management of the faltering economy she inherited from Mutharika. Her decision to devalue the currency was intended to foster freemarket processes in the long run in order to spur greater production for local and export markets and boost macroeconomic stability, among other ends. In the short run, however, it has sharply driven up inflation, including for fuel and food, sparking public protests and labor strikes. In addition, some donors have released aid funds more slowly than initially anticipated or have imposed new aid policy conditions. Banda also faces rifts within her own party and faltering parliamentary support. The recent arrest of several former Mutharika officials on treason charges related to a plot to prevent Banda’s constitutional accession to the presidency has also caused controversy.

In addition to a $350 million, five-year MCC compact, the United States provides significant bilateral aid focused on food security and agricultural growth; poverty reduction; health and education; economic growth; and democracy and good governance. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered bilateral assistance to Malawi totaled over $173 million in FY2011; an estimated $167 million in FY2012; and $146 million in requested funds for FY2013.


Date of Report: March 21, 2013
Number of Pages: 23
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Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs

• The U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic partner and anchor state in East Africa, and as critical to counterterrorism efforts in the region. Kenya has repeatedly been a target of terrorist attacks, and the concentration of potential international and domestic targets in Kenya remains a serious concern. Its military plays a key role in regional operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia.

• Kenya ranks among the top U.S. foreign aid recipients in the world, receiving nearly $1 billion annually in development, humanitarian, and security assistance in recent years. The country hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Africa.

• There is considerable uncertainty surrounding Kenya’s upcoming elections on March 4. President Mwai Kibaki is retiring after serving two terms, and a close race and crowded field of candidates appears likely to force a presidential runoff in April. The international community is particularly concerned with the potential for a repeat of the widespread violence, largely along ethnic lines, that followed Kenya’s last elections in December 2007. That crisis tarnished Kenya’s generally peaceful reputation and had a significant impact on its economy, which is East Africa’s largest and most diverse.

• The March elections are the first to be held under a new constitution, and are its most complex yet, with voters casting six different ballots for presidential, parliamentary, and local candidates. Domestic and foreign observers have expressed concerns with technical challenges such as long queues and insufficient voter education; localized political violence; and allegations of vote buying, voter intimidation, and threats against the judges responsible for resolving electoral disputes. Rumors of bias and partisan activities by some top government officials persist, and questions regarding police preparedness remain. Polls suggest voting may largely follow ethnic lines, as in previous elections.

• The presidential frontrunners appear to be Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta. Kenyatta and his running mate, William Ruto, stand indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Their trials are scheduled to begin in early April at the Hague. Their supporters have portrayed the cases as driven by Odinga and purported Western allies, and their continued compliance with the court, should they win the election, is in question.

• Kenya’s key aid donors and senior Obama Administration officials have been supportive of the ICC process for the country, and several foreign governments have indicated that diplomatic interaction with Kenya’s top leadership may be limited in the event of a Kenyatta/Ruto win. Additional foreign government restrictions on trade and aid may apply, depending on the Kenyan government’s compliance with the court. Implications for U.S. relations, assistance, and future cooperation remain unclear, given that the United States is not a state party to the ICC. This may be a key question for Congress in the coming months, as it weighs various governance, human rights, and security priorities in the country.

• Impunity for state corruption and political violence has been a major challenge that continues to threaten Kenya’s long-term stability. Reforms required under the new constitution, if fully implemented, could set the country on a new course.


Date of Report: February 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 19
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