Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Over forty years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan uprising is occurring in the context of popular protest movements and political change in other countries in North Africa and the Middle East, and the situation in Libya is demanding extraordinary responses from regional and international decision makers. In mid-February 2011, confrontations between opposition activists and government security forces in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Bayda resulted in the death of some unarmed protestors. Security forces used military force to subdue subsequent funeral gatherings and protests in incidents that reportedly killed or wounded dozens, if not hundreds, of civilians. Opposition groups seized several police and military facilities and took control of some eastern cities. In the weeks that have followed, Qadhafi-supporters’ counterattacks on opposition-controlled areas and opposition advances toward Qadhafi strongholds have pushed Libya to the brink of civil war.
The opposition has been bolstered by defections of some military units, senior officers, and civilian officials to their cause. The opposition has formed an Interim Transitional National Council that seeks international recognition as the coordinating body of the Libyan opposition. Qadhafi may retain limited popular and family support and is relying on the backing of hard-line security elements prepared to use military force against opponents. Qadhafi and his supporters describe the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Both sides continue to express wariness of direct foreign military intervention, although opposition forces reportedly have discussed seeking foreign air support. A stalemate has emerged, with inconclusive fighting in some western cities and in eastern coastal areas.
Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of rapprochement and engagement toward Qadhafi and Libya after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. The United Nations Security Council, the United States, the European Union and other parties have imposed an arms embargo on Libya and targeted sanctions on Qadhafi, his family, and his supporters in an attempt to limit further violence against Libyan citizens. Multilateral efforts to evacuate third-country nationals continue, and the United States and several international partners are mobilizing to provide assistance to tens of thousands now facing difficult conditions in temporary camps in Tunisia and Egypt.
Options for asserting further U.S. and international influence on developments in Libya are complicated by the prevailing political uncertainty and the considerable tradeoffs associated with direct military intervention. Many observers have warned that Libya’s weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict increase the possibility that sustained unrest could follow any fundamental change in government. President Obama has ordered U.S. military and civilian officials to prepare for various contingencies, and some in Congress have urged the Administration to take direct action to protect the opposition and help Libyans unseat Qadhafi. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the unfolding conflict in Libya, the views of key players, and the potential consequences of various policy options now under consideration.
Date of Report: March 9, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
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Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
On January 14, 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country for Saudi Arabia following weeks of mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s mass popular uprising, dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,” appears to have added momentum to anti-government and pro-reform sentiment in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Jordan, and other countries. Although Tunisia’s prodemocracy movement has been internationally heralded, it has also contributed to concern over stability in a region long associated with seemingly secure, autocratic, pro-Western regimes.
Ben Ali’s departure was greeted by widespread euphoria within Tunisia. However, political instability, economic crisis, and insecurity are continuing challenges. On February 27, amid a resurgence in anti-government demonstrations, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi (a holdover from Ben Ali’s administration) stepped down and was replaced by Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of the late founding President Habib Bourguiba. On March 3, the interim government announced a new transition “road map” that would entail the election on July 24 of a “National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly would, in turn, be charged with reforming Tunisia’s constitution ahead of expected presidential and parliamentary elections, which have not been scheduled. The protest movement has greeted the road map as a victory, but many questions remain concerning its implementation.
Until January, Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted near-total control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity. The government cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner, as well as with the United States. Despite many political and economic characteristics shared across the region, Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes: it has a relatively small territory, a large and highly educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia’s Islamist movement has not played a leading role in the expression of domestic dissent in recent years, although it did in the 1980s before it was banned by Ben Ali.
Tunisia’s unexpected and rapid transition raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region. These pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces carried over from the former regime; the potential shape of the new political order; the future role of Islamist and/or radical movements in the government and society; the role of the military and domestic security services; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other actors—of encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy priorities. Congress may play a role in developments through its foreign assistance policies and through its oversight of U.S.-Tunisia relations and broader U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
U.S.-Tunisian relations are highly focused on military assistance and counterterrorism. The Obama Administration, which grew increasingly critical of Ben Ali’s government as protests mounted, has since pledged to support Tunisia’s democratic transition and has called for free and fair elections. However, Administration officials have not specified what types of democracyrelated assistance may be forthcoming, and the Administration’s FY2012 bilateral aid request does not include any non-military funding. Congress has been supportive of security assistance programs in Tunisia, directing the State Department in FY2009 and FY2010 to allocate levels of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) that surpassed budget requests by the executive branch.
Date of Report: March 4, 2011
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: RS21666
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Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Côte d'Ivoire has entered a renewed period of extreme political instability, accompanied by significant political violence, following a contested presidential election designed to cap an often forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at reunifying Côte d'Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002. A sharp uptick in armed clashes in late February 2011, among other indicators, signaled a heightened risk that a renewed war might break out.
This instability directly threatens long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d'Ivoire, among other U.S. objectives. Indirectly at stake are broader, long-term U.S. efforts to ensure regional stability, peace, democratic and accountable governance, and economic growth in West Africa, along with billions of dollars of U.S. foreign aid to achieve these ends. The United States has supported the Ivoirian peace process since the 2002 war, both diplomatically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); funded a UNOCI predecessor, the U.N. Mission in Côte d'Ivoire; and assisted in the deployment in 2003 of a now defunct Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force. The 112th Congress may be asked to consider additional funding for UNOCI; U.S. support for a potential ECOWAS military intervention force; or funding for emergency humanitarian aid if the political-military situation significantly deteriorates.
On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two leading winners of a first-round poll a month earlier. Both claim to have won the runoff and separately inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara bases his victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). These show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, endorsed the IECannounced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. H.Res. 85 (Payne), introduced on February 10, 2011, voices support for these positions. Gbagbo, rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which reviewed and annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo therefore claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to Ouattara.
The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in political tension and violence, deaths and human rights abuses, and spurred attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has broadly rejected Gbagbo’s victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president. It is using diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. H.Res. 85 would express congressional support for such ends. Top U.S officials have attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down. An existing U.S. ban on bilateral aid was augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo administration. As of early 2011, regional mediation had produced few results. Continued political volatility was likely under most current scenarios, and there was a growing risk of war. A unity government might temporarily reduce political tension, but would likely not resolve the root causes of the crisis. If the political crisis is resolved, however, Côte d'Ivoire is well-placed to recover economically.
Date of Report: March 19, 2011
Number of Pages: 66
Order Number: RS21989
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Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
Kenya, a nation of about 36.9 million people, has been an important ally of the United States for decades. Kenya moved from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy in 1992. Kenyans voted in record numbers in the country’s first multi-party election in almost 26 years. President Daniel arap Moi defeated opposition candidates by a small margin. In 1997, Kenya held its second multiparty elections, at the height of tensions between the opposition and the ruling party. President Moi was re-elected with 40% of the votes cast, while his nearest rival, Mwai Kibaki, won 31%. In the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). In the presidential election, NARC leader Kibaki defeated Uhuru Kenyatta, the leader of KANU.
On December 27, 2007, millions of Kenyans went to the polls in Kenya’s fourth multi-party elections, with the hope of strengthening the institutions of democracy and, most importantly in the view of many observers, of bringing change. An estimated 14.2 million (82% of the total eligible voters) Kenyans were registered to vote, while 2,547 parliamentary candidates were qualified to run in 210 constituencies, according to the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). Nine candidates competed in the presidential election. The opposition reportedly made significant gains in the parliamentary elections. The ECK, however, hastily declared President Kibaki as the winner of the elections. Kibaki was quickly sworn in as president, while international and domestic election observers declared the elections as rigged and deeply flawed.
Following the announcement of the election results, violence erupted in many parts of Kenya. More than 1,000 people have been killed and an estimated 350,000 reportedly displaced. In August 2008, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) released a report on the post-election violence. In early February, the opposition and the government began negotiations under the leadership of former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. The two parties agreed to work together to end the violence, improve humanitarian conditions, and write a new constitution within a year. In late February, the government and the opposition reached a powersharing arrangement. On March 18, 2008, the Kenya parliament unanimously approved the agreement. On April 3, 2008, the parties agreed on a 40-member cabinet. But important reforms agreed to by the parties have yet to be implemented. The initial United States government reaction to the December elections was considered by some international observers as contradictory and seen by some Kenyans as being one-sided in favor of President Kibaki. On December 30, the United States government reportedly congratulated President Kibaki. Senior Bush Administration officials visited Kenya in an effort to resolve the crisis and provided support to Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts. The Obama Administration has repeatedly pressed the government of Kenya to implement reforms agreed to by the parties in 2008. In September 2009, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson sent a letter to 15 Kenyan officials warning them that reforms must be implemented. In April 2010, the Kenyan parliament passed a new draft constitution, and on August 4, 2010, Kenyans approved the new constitution. The next general elections are scheduled for 2012.
Date of Report: February 28, 2011
Number of Pages: 17
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Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency. In February 2011, Ugandans voted in presidential and parliamentary elections. President Museveni won 68% of the vote, while his nearest opponent, Kizza Besigye, won 26% of the vote.
In the north, the government of Uganda has long fought the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million people and resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In 2006-2008, the government of Uganda and the LRA were engaged in an effort to resolve the conflict peacefully. The government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) mediated the talks. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In February 2008, the parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire and amended the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions. However, the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, failed to show up for the final signing of the agreement on a number of occasions. The cessation of hostilities has allowed an estimated 1.4 million people to return to their homes. In November 2007, an LRA delegation went to Kampala for the first time and held talks with senior Ugandan officials. In late 2007, Vincent Otti, the deputy commander of the LRA, reportedly was killed in Uganda by Joseph Kony, the head of the LRA. In December 2009, the deputy commander of the LRA, Bok Abudema, was killed by Ugandan forces in Central African Republic. In 2009 and 2010, a number of senior commanders have been killed or captured or have defected. In late November 2010, the Obama Administration announced a “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the LRA”, as called for in P.L. 111-172.
In late October 2007, President Museveni visited Washington, DC, and met with President Bush and other senior Administration officials. President Museveni also met with several Members of Congress. During his visit, President Museveni discussed a wide range of issues, including U.S.- Uganda relations, the crises in Somalia and Darfur, trade, and HIV/AIDS. Uganda deployed an estimated 2,700 peacekeeping troops to Somalia, shortly after Ethiopian forces invaded Mogadishu and installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). As of July 2010, more than 20 members of the Ugandan peacekeeping forces have been killed. In late November 2010, President Museveni visited Mogadishu, Somalia.
On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than 80 injured. The United Nations, the African Union, and the United States condemned the terrorist attacks. More than 20 suspects are currently in prison.
Date of Report: February 28, 2011
Number of Pages: 39
Order Number: RL33701
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