Alexis
Arieff
Analyst in
African Affairs
Senegal, a
small, semi-arid nation on West Africa’s Atlantic coast, has long been viewed
as one of the region’s most stable democracies. Political trends under
former President Abdoulaye Wade (in office 2000-2012) raised concerns
among analysts and policymakers over possible democratic “backsliding,”
particularly in connection with Wade’s attempt to win a third term in office in elections
held on February 26, 2012. Popular anger over Wade’s candidacy sparked demonstrations
and rioting, leading analysts to question Senegal’s stability and the potential
for a free and fair vote. To many observers’ surprise, voting was
peaceful, and Wade lost to opposition candidate (and former protégé) Macky
Sall in a run-off vote held on March 25. Wade did not contest the results,
instead calling Sall to concede. Sall was sworn in on April 2, becoming Senegal’s
fourth president since independence in 1960. The election results and Wade’s concession
were internationally hailed as a victory for democracy in an often troubled
region.
The State Department refers to U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent.” U.S.
bilateral engagement has increased in recent years. Bilateral assistance,
estimated at $98.8 million in FY2011, is focused on public health, food
security, democratic governance, economic growth, rural development, and
military professionalism. In addition, the United States signed a $540 million
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact with Senegal in 2009. The United States
has viewed Senegal as an anchor of regional stability and a potential partner
in combating transnational security threats, such as terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, and maritime piracy. Senegal is a significant contributor of
troops to international peacekeeping missions, and thousands of Senegalese
peacekeepers have received U.S. training through the State Department’s Africa
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. During the
later years of Wade’s presidency, senior U.S. officials expressed concerns
over negative governance trends and over Wade’s decision to run for a
third term, while Wade publicly objected to what he views as outside
attempts to interfere in domestic politics.
Congress plays a role in guiding U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization, appropriation,
and oversight of foreign assistance and executive branch policies. Some Members of
Congress expressed concern regarding the decision to award Senegal an MCC
compact in light of concerns over corruption and political trends under Wade.
In the conference report accompanying P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2012, appropriators directed the allocation of at
least $50 million in development aid to Senegal, while also expressing concern over
Senegal’s failure, to date, to bring to justice former Chadian president
Hissène Habré, who lives in Senegal and has been accused of crimes against
humanity.
Date of Report: April 11, 2012
Number of Pages: 16
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Alexis
Arieff
Analyst in
African Affairs
Guinea, a
former French colony on West Africa’s Atlantic coast with a population of about
10 million, is rich in natural resources, but its citizens are afflicted
by widespread poverty. The past four years have seen a series of dramatic
political changes for a country that had previously had only two
presidents in the first 50 years after independence in 1958. In late 2008, a
military junta took power following the death of longtime president
Lansana Conté. Amid growing popular opposition to the junta’s rule, the
military violently cracked down on peaceful protests in September 2009,
sparking widespread condemnation and increased international isolation. Two months
later, junta leader Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara was shot and wounded by his own bodyguard,
and his departure paved the way for a military-led transitional government.
In 2010, Guineans voted in their country’s first presidential elections
organized by an independent electoral commission and without an incumbent
candidate. Longtime opposition leader in exile Alpha Condé, who had never
served in government, was declared the winner. Condé’s inauguration
brought an end to two years of military rule and could potentially enable
political and economic reforms viewed as prerequisites for private sector
growth and increased respect for human rights. Yet political, security,
and socioeconomic challenges remain stark. The authority and capacity of
state institutions remain badly eroded, the underlying causes of military involvement
in politics and the economy have not been fully addressed, and Condé has been accused
by opposition parties of attempting to delay and manipulate planned legislative
elections.
International policy makers view Guinea as central to preserving security gains
in neighboring Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, whose populations
have numerous cross-border links with Guinea. While Guinea has experienced
regular episodes of internal political turmoil since independence in 1958,
it has been considered a locus of relative stability during much of the past 25
years, during which time each of its six neighbors suffered armed internal
conflicts. Since the military coup of 2008, however, Guinea has been seen
as a potential vector of insecurity, particularly as its role as a hub in
the transnational narcotics trade has grown.
U.S. engagement in Guinea has focused on democratization and good governance; counternarcotics
issues; security sector reform; regional peace and stability; U.S. investment issues;
and socioeconomic and institutional development. Following the 2008 military
coup, the United States identified Guinea’s political transition as a key
policy goal in West Africa and made significant financial and diplomatic
contributions toward the success of Guinea’s election process. Selective
U.S. bilateral aid restrictions, which were imposed in connection with the
coup, have been lifted in the wake of the successful transfer of power to
a civilian-led administration. Congress may play a role in guiding U.S.
engagement with Guinea through the authorization, appropriation, and
oversight of U.S. programs and policies.
The FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) continues
restrictions, contained in previous annual appropriations bills, on Guinea’s
ability to receive certain forms of State Department-administered security
assistance. The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81)
authorizes Guinea, among several West African countries, to receive Defense Department-administered
counter-narcotics assistance. Guinea-focused legislation introduced during
the 111th Congress included H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen) and S.Res. 345 (Boxer).
Date of Report: March 29, 2012
Number of Pages: 16
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Number: R40703
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Alexis
Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Lauren Ploch
Specialist in African Affairs
The Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, is a small, dispersed armed group in central
Africa that originated 24 years ago in Uganda. Its infliction of widespread
human suffering and its potential threat to regional stability have drawn
significant congressional attention. Campaigns by U.S.-based advocacy
groups, using social media and other methods, have also spurred
policymakers’ interest. Despite its Ugandan origins, the LRA currently operates in
remote regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African
Republic, and South Sudan. When the LRA was based in northern Uganda, the
United States provided humanitarian relief and other aid for the war-torn
region. As the LRA has moved across central Africa, the United States has
taken on a more expansive role in countering its impact. Since 2008, the United States
has supported regional operations led by the Ugandan military to capture or
kill LRA commanders. The United States has also extended humanitarian aid,
pursued regional diplomacy, and pushed for “early-warning” systems and
multilateral programs to demobilize and reintegrate ex-LRA combatants.
Growing U.S. involvement may also be viewed in the context of Uganda’s role
as a key regional security partner. The LRA is on the State Department’s
“Terrorist Exclusion List,” and Kony is a “Specially Designated Global
Terrorist.”
In May 2010, Congress enacted the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and
Northern Uganda Recovery Act (P.L. 111-172), which required the Obama
Administration to submit to Congress a “strategy” to “guide future United
States support ... for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate
the threat to civilians and regional stability” posed by the LRA. The
Administration’s policy response, submitted in November 2010, emphasizes
the protection of civilians, the “removal” of top LRA commanders, the
promotion of LRA desertions, and the provision of humanitarian relief. On
October 14, 2011, the President reported to Congress, “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that he had authorized the deployment of approximately 100
U.S. military personnel to serve as advisors to “regional forces that are
working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield.” The
Administration has portrayed this decision as consistent with
congressional intent as expressed in P.L. 111-172 and subsequent consultations.
The U.S. approach to the LRA raises a number of policy issues, some of which
could have implications far beyond central Africa. A key question, for
some, is whether the response is commensurate with the level of threat the
LRA poses to U.S. interests, and whether the deployment of U.S. military
personnel could lead to unintended consequences. More broadly, decisions
on this issue could potentially be viewed as a precedent for U.S. responses to
similar situations in the future. Other issues for Congress include the
timing and rationale for U.S. action; the role and likely duration of U.S.
deployments in the region; the benchmarks for success and/or withdrawal of
U.S. forces; funding levels for counter-LRA activities and for potential future humanitarian
aid and related commitments; and the relative priority of counter-LRA
activities compared to other foreign policy and budgetary goals. Other
possible policy challenges include regional militaries’ capacity and will
to conduct U.S.-supported operations, and these militaries’ relative level
of respect for human rights. Congressional oversight may also focus on the appropriateness
of the Administration’s LRA policy approach, as outlined in November 2010; the status
of its implementation; interagency coordination; and the role of other donors.
Related draft legislation includes H.R. 4077, H.R. 895, H.Res. 465, H.Res.
583, S.Res. 402, and S.Res. 412. Provisions relevant to U.S. counter-LRA
efforts are also included in P.L. 112-74 (Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012) and P.L. 112-81 (National Defense Authorization Act of 2012).
Date of Report: April 11, 2012
Number of Pages: 23
Order Number: R42094
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Alexis
Arieff
Analyst in
African Affairs
Senegal, a
small, semi-arid nation on West Africa’s Atlantic coast, has long been viewed
as one of the region’s most stable democracies. However, recent political
trends have raised concerns among analysts and policymakers. Attention is
currently focused on plans by President Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced “wahd”),
85, to run for a third term in elections scheduled for February 26, 2012.
Opponents claim that Wade’s candidacy is unconstitutional, pointing to a
twoterm limit in Senegal’s 2001 constitution. However, Wade’s eligibility
to run was upheld in late January by Senegal’s Constitutional Council,
which ruled that the constitutional provision did not apply to Wade’s
first term in office (2000-2007), since the 2001 constitution was promulgated during
his first term. The dispute has sparked demonstrations and rioting, leading
analysts to question Senegal’s stability and the potential for a free and
fair vote.
In office since 2000, Wade was initially credited with expanding civil
liberties, bolstering economic growth, improving government health and
education services, and negotiating a landmark peace accord in the
long-volatile southern Casamance region. He was returned to office in 2007
in an election that the State Department termed “open, peaceful, and highly
competitive,” despite objections by opposition parties, which boycotted
subsequent legislative elections. Wade’s reputation has since been marred
by his increasingly unilateral exercise of power, along with reports of
rising corruption, nepotism, and restrictions on civil liberties. Violence has
also flared in Casamance since 2009, despite the previous peace deal.
The State Department refers to U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent,” while
noting concerns over negative governance trends. In early 2012, State
Department officials publicly criticized Wade’s decision to run for a
third term, with State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland calling on
Wade on January 30 to “cede to the next generation.” Wade has publicly objected
to what he views as outside attempts to interfere in domestic politics.
U.S. bilateral engagement has increased in recent years. Bilateral assistance,
estimated at $98.8 million in FY2011, is focused on public health, food
security, democratic governance, economic growth, rural development, and
military professionalism. In addition, the United States signed a $540
million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact with Senegal in 2009.
The United States has viewed Senegal as an anchor of regional stability
and a potential partner in combating transnational security threats, such
as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and maritime piracy. Senegal is a
significant contributor of troops to international peacekeeping missions, and thousands
of Senegalese peacekeepers have received U.S. training through the State
Department’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)
program.
Congress plays a role in guiding U.S. policy toward Senegal through its
authorization, appropriation, and oversight of foreign assistance and
executive branch policies. Some Members of Congress have recently
expressed concern regarding the decision to award Senegal an MCC compact
in light of concerns over corruption and political trends. In the conference
report accompanying P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, appropriators directed the allocation of at least $50 million in
development aid to Senegal, while also expressing concern over Senegal’s
failure, to date, to bring to justice former Chadian president Hissène Habré,
who lives in Senegal and has been accused of crimes against humanity.
Date of Report: February 20, 2012
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: R41369
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP
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Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
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Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American
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Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and its largest democracy, is one of the U.S. government’s key strategic partners on the continent. It is Africa’s most populous country, with over 155 million people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian, and its second-largest economy. Diplomatic relations with Nigeria, which is among the top five oil exporters to the United States, are strong, and the country is a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. After 16 years of military rule, Nigeria made the transition to civilian governance in 1999, and emerged as a powerful actor in African politics. Nigeria’s government has mediated disputes in several African countries, and the country ranks fourth among troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria faces serious social and economic challenges, however, that some analysts contend threaten the stability of both the state and the region, and which have the potential to affect global oil markets. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, religious, and geographic lines, and misrule has undermined the authority and legitimacy of the state. Nigeria’s annual oil and natural gas revenues are estimated at over $60 billion, but its human development indicators are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty. The government relies on the oil sector for over 85% of revenues. By some estimates, Nigeria could rank among the world’s top five exporters of oil within a few years, but social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the country’s oil-producing Niger Delta region have hindered production as well as development.
Inter-communal conflicts in parts of the country are common. Resentment between the northern and southern regions, and among communities in central Nigeria, has led periodically to considerable unrest. Thousands have been killed in periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. The attempted terror attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian in December 2009 and the resurgence of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, have also heightened concerns regarding the possible radicalization of Nigerian Muslims. While Boko Haram has remained primarily focused on a domestic agenda, there are reports that some of its members may be expanding ties with more developed violent Islamist groups on the continent.
Nigeria’s most recent elections, held in April 2011, were viewed by many as a critical test of the government’s commitment to democracy. The State Department had deemed the previous elections to be deeply flawed, and some observers contended that Nigeria had not held a free and fair general election since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Election observer groups characterized the 2011 elections as a significant improvement over previous polls, although not without problems. Post-election violence across the north highlighted lingering communal tensions, grievances, and mistrust. President Goodluck Jonathan, who was re-elected, faces mounting, and at times competing, internal and external pressure to implement reforms deemed critical to addressing corruption and other development and security challenges.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigeria’s recent reform initiatives, including anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern. Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments and has expressed concerns with corruption and human rights abuses. Congress provides oversight for over $600 million in U.S. foreign assistance programs in Nigeria—one of the largest U.S. assistance packages in Africa.
Date of Report: January 19, 2012
Number of Pages: 31
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