Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement

Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs

Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war intermittently for four decades. More than 2 million people have died in Southern Sudan over the past two decades due to war-related causes and famine, and millions have been displaced from their homes. In July 2002, the Sudan government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a peace framework agreement in Kenya. On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the final peace agreement at a ceremony held in Nairobi, Kenya. In April 2010, Sudan held national and regional elections. In January 2011, South Sudan held a referendum to decide on unity or independence. Abyei was also expected to hold a referendum in January 2011 to decide whether to retain the current special administrative status or to be part of South Sudan. The Abyei referendum did not take place. In the Southern referendum, 98.8% voted for independence and 1.17% for unity. In late May 2011, Sudan government forces dissolved the joint Abyei Administration and invaded the town, displacing more than 100,000 people in the Abyei area.

The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged to challenge the National Congress Party (NCP) government in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur in western Sudan has led to a major humanitarian disaster, with an estimated 1.9 million people displaced, more than 240,000 people forced into neighboring Chad, and an estimated 450,000 people killed. In July 2004, the House and Senate declared the atrocities in Darfur genocide, and the Bush Administration reached the same conclusion in September 2004. On May 4, 2006, the Government of National Unity and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) after almost two years of negotiations. In 2010, the SLM pulled out of the government and joined other rebel groups. As of May 2011, no agreement has been reached between the government and Darfur rebel groups.

In July 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1769, authorizing the deployment of a robust peacekeeping force to Darfur. The resolution calls for the deployment of 26,000 peacekeeping troops to Darfur and authorizes the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to take all necessary measures to protect its personnel and humanitarian workers. As of April 30, 2011, UNAMID deployed a total of 23,129 peacekeeping personnel. As of April 2011, 89 peacekeeping personnel have been killed in Darfur. In July 2008, International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo accused President Omar Bashir of Sudan of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and on March 4, 2009, the ICC Pre- Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest for President Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In late October 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new Sudan policy. The policy focuses on three policy priorities: the crisis in Darfur, the implementation of the North-South peace agreement, and counter-terrorism. The new policy links the lifting of sanctions and incentives to verifiable progress on the ground. In mid-September, the Obama Administration announced new policy initiatives on Sudan. The new policy update focuses on the Administration’s active and expanded diplomatic engagement and relaxation of sanctions and restrictions. On March 31, 2011, President Obama appointed Ambassador Princeton Lyman as Special Envoy for Sudan.


Date of Report: June 15, 2011
Number of Pages: 42
Order Number: RL33574
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Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda

Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs

In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency. In February 2011, Ugandans voted in presidential and parliamentary elections. President Museveni won 68% of the vote, while his nearest opponent, Besigye, won 26% of the vote. In April 2011, a number of opposition leaders, including Besigye, were arrested after multiple “walk to work” demonstrations.

In the north, the government of Uganda has long fought the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million people and resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In 2006-2008, the government of Uganda and the LRA were engaged in an effort to resolve the conflict peacefully. The government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) mediated the talks. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In February 2008, the parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire and amended the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions. However, the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, failed to show up for the final signing of the agreement on a number of occasions. The cessation of hostilities has allowed an estimated 1.4 million people to return to their homes. In November 2007, an LRA delegation went to Kampala for the first time and held talks with senior Ugandan officials. In late 2007, Vincent Otti, the deputy commander of the LRA, reportedly was killed in Uganda by Joseph Kony, the head of the LRA. In December 2009, the deputy commander of the LRA, Bok Abudema, was killed by Ugandan forces in Central African Republic. In 2009 and 2010, a number of senior commanders have been killed or captured or have defected. In late November 2010, the Obama Administration announced a “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the LRA,” as called for in P.L. 111-172.

In late October 2007, President Museveni visited Washington, DC, and met with President Bush and other senior Administration officials. President Museveni also met with several Members of Congress. During his visit, President Museveni discussed a wide range of issues, including U.S.- Uganda relations, the crises in Somalia and Darfur, trade, and HIV/AIDS. Uganda deployed an estimated 2,700 peacekeeping troops to Somalia, shortly after Ethiopian forces invaded Mogadishu and installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). As of June, there are an estimated 5,000 Ugandan peacekeeping troops in Somalia. As of June 2011, more than 50 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces have been killed. In early June 2011, six peacekeepers were killed, including a senior Ugandan officer.

On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than 80 injured. The United Nations, the African Union, and the United States condemned the terrorist attacks. More than 20 suspects are currently in prison.


Date of Report: June 8, 2011
Number of Pages: 40
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Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager

Over 40 years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. The United States military is participating in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and other partner governments also are participating. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid coalition air strikes and defections. His forces continue to attack opposition-held areas. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council (TNC), which claims to represent all areas of the country. They seek foreign political recognition and material support.

Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26. As of June 6, NATO officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi’s military to control the country’s airspace. Coalition forces target pro- Qadhafi ground forces found to be violating Resolution 1973 through attacks that threaten civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces, and Resolution 1973 forbids “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” On May 5, the Italy and Qatar co-chaired the second meeting of the intergovernmental Libya Contact Group, and endorsed terms of reference for a temporary financial mechanism to support the TNC and the unfreezing of seized assets for humanitarian costs. Qatar, Italy, Kuwait, France, and others have formally recognized the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. The United States and others continue to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons.

Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of reengagement toward Qadhafi after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. While U.S. military operations continue, Obama Administration officials highlight a number of non-military steps the U.S. government has taken to achieve Qadhafi’s ouster, such as new targeted sanctions established in Executive Order 13566. Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force. On March 21 and May 20, President Obama sent letters to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization. House and Senate resolutions now seek to further define the goals and limits of future U.S. engagement.

Many observers believe that Libya’s weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential long term consequences of military operations and political intervention.


Date of Report: June 6, 2011
Number of Pages: 51
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Morocco: Current Issues

Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs

The United States government views Morocco as an important ally against terrorism and a free trade partner. Congress is particularly interested in Morocco because it is a recipient of considerable U.S. foreign assistance for counterterrorism and socioeconomic development, including a five-year, $697.5 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) aid program agreed to in 2007. Morocco is also a significant purchaser of U.S. defense articles.

King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but has taken some liberalizing steps with uncertain effects. In early March 2011, amid a series of ongoing political protests that have coincided with demonstrations across the region, the king announced a broad reform plan, including constitutional changes to strengthen the legislature and judiciary, and the creation of an independent National Council Human Rights. The constitutional reforms are expected to be drafted by a commission selected by the king, then voted on by citizens in a referendum. The protests, which have been largely peaceful, have continued, however, with some activists criticizing the king’s control over the reform process and calling for more radical changes to the political system. Authorities have tolerated many of the protests, but in some cases security forces have used violence to disperse demonstrators and have beaten prominent activists. Senior U.S. officials have expressed strong support for the government’s reform efforts.

Morocco’s comprehensive approach to countering terrorism involves security measures, economic reforms, control of religious outlets, education, and international cooperation. Morocco experienced devastating terrorist attacks in 2003, and Moroccan nationals have been implicated in attacks and plots overseas. In April 2011, after years without a domestic attack, a bomb exploded at a popular tourist café in Marrakesh, killing 17 people, mostly Europeans. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered the greatest regional threat, has not mounted a successful attack in Morocco and denied responsibility for the April Marrakesh bombing. However, individual Moroccans have joined AQIM outside of the country and the group has reportedly attempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point for transnational smuggling operations.

Morocco’s human rights record is uneven. A number of abuses have been documented along with constraints on freedom of expression. At the same time, the 2004 Family Code is a landmark initiative that could improve the socioeconomic rights of women if fully implemented. The king has also sought to provide a public record of abuses perpetrated before he ascended the throne in 1999 and to enhance the rights of ethnic Berbers (Amazigh/Imazighen), the original inhabitants of the region. In 2010, questions about religious freedom arose when foreign Christians were expelled for illegal proselytizing, sparking criticism by some Members of Congress.

Morocco’s foreign policy focuses largely on France, Spain, and the United States. Morocco’s relations with its neighbor Algeria are troubled by the unresolved dispute over the Western Sahara, a territory south of Morocco that Morocco largely occupies and views as an integral part of its national territory. Algeria supports the POLISARIO Front in its quest for the region’s selfdetermination. Recent signals, however, indicate that Moroccan-Algerian relations may be warming. Relations between Morocco and Israel are strained, though at the same time, 600,000 Moroccan Jews are citizens of Israel. Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Iran in 2009.

See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff; and CRS Report RS21464, Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, by Raymond J. Ahearn


Date of Report: May 27, 2011
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: RS21579
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Executive Branch Reorganization Initiatives During the 112th Congress: A Brief Overview

Henry B. Hogue
Analyst in American National Government

President Barack Obama announced, in his State of the Union address, that his Administration would be proposing a reorganization of executive branch agencies. On March 11, 2011, the President issued a memorandum to the heads of departments and executive branch agencies providing further detail and direction on the development of a reorganization plan. The Deputy Director for Management (DDM) at the Office of Management and Budget was given the responsibility for “leading the effort to create a plan” for executive branch reorganization, with a “first focus … on the executive departments and agencies and the functions that support one of our most important priorities increasing trade, exports, and our overall competitiveness (‘trade and competitiveness’).” The DDM is to submit related recommendations, based on specified principles, to the President within 90 days of the memorandum’s issuance (i.e., by June 9, 2011).

A number of bills with reorganization-related provisions have been introduced in the House and Senate during the 112th Congress. Some of these provisions would defund or abolish specified government programs and agencies (e.g., H.R. 1, H.R. 861, H.R. 672, and S. 162). Some introduced bills would merge existing agencies and their functions or consolidate programs (e.g., H.R. 1782, S. 892, and S. 945). Other bills would establish bipartisan commissions that would evaluate current organizational arrangements and develop legislation that would be considered by Congress under expedited procedures (e.g., H.R. 155 and S. 14). Still other bills would make changes to organizational arrangements that were newly established by the 111th Congress, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Independent Payment Advisory Board (e.g., H.R. 557, H.R. 1355, H.R. 1121, S. 737, H.R. 452, and S. 668).

The context within which the Obama Administration and Congress are proposing and considering changes to the federal bureaucracy is shaped by a number of factors. These factors include heightened concerns about the federal debt, the deficit, job creation, and economic recovery; controversy related to financial regulatory and health care financing-related agencies established by legislation enacted during the 111th Congress; a belief, among some, that the federal government should be smaller and more efficient; and a perception that some agencies have failed to fulfill their responsibilities.

Constitutionally, the establishment and organization of governmental entities, such as departments and agencies, is the province of Congress. The President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. In the past, Congress has provided the President with greater leverage to statutorily change executive branch organizational arrangements by enacting time-limited expedited reorganization processes. Presidents and their political appointees also have a variety of administrative tools at their disposal for making smaller-scale structural and process organizational changes.

This report describes the ways that executive branch reorganization can occur as a result of Administration and congressional actions, and describes recent initiatives in the context of that typology. The report concludes with some observations regarding federal reorganization efforts.


Date of Report: May 26, 2011
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: R41841
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