Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Over forty years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry in February and early March 2011, and a stalemate began to break in favor of the Qadhafi government, threatening civilians in opposition-held areas. The United States and other European and Arab states are now carrying out military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17 and authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid the dismantling of his military by coalition air strikes. His supporters threatened to respond to attacks by striking civilian and military targets in the Mediterranean region.
Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26, “while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” As of March 28, U.S. military officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi’s military to control the country’s airspace and were increasingly focused on targeting pro-Qadhafi ground forces found to be continuing to violate Resolution 1973 through attacks on Libyan civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces and has called for Qadhafi to step down. The no-fly zone called for in Resolution 1973 is in place and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is assuming command of coalition operations. The United States and international partners are providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons in temporary camps in Tunisia and Egypt.
Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of reengagement toward Qadhafi after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. President Obama now has joined some leaders in asserting that Muammar al Qadhafi must ultimately give up power, although that outcome is not called for explicitly in Resolution 1973. Obama Administration officials highlight a number of non-military steps the U.S. government has taken to achieve that objective, while military operations to protect Libyan civilians continue. U.S. steps include new targeted sanctions established in Executive Order 13566. Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force. Some executive-legislative consultation occurred prior to the start of U.S. military operations, and, on March 21, President Obama sent a letter to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization.
Many observers believe that Libya’s weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council which claims to represent all areas of the country and is seeking recognition and material support. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential consequences of the military action under way and other policy proposals under consideration.
Date of Report: March 29, 2011
Number of Pages: 36
Order Number: RL33142
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Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Senegal is a small, Francophone nation with a population of 13 million, located on West Africa’s Atlantic coast. It has experienced steady, if limited, economic growth in recent years, but remains one of the world’s least developed countries. Over 90% of Senegal’s population is Muslim, the majority of whom adhere to an indigenous Sufi order. A semi-arid country in Africa’s Sahel region, Senegal has struggled with food insecurity and the impact of global climate change.
Although Senegal is a secular democracy and enjoys relative stability by regional standards, recent political trends have raised concerns among analysts and policy makers. President Abdoulaye Wade (pronounced “wahd”), in office since 2000, was initially credited with expanding civil liberties, liberalizing the economy, bolstering government health and education services, and negotiating a landmark peace accord in the restive southern Casamance region. He was returned to office in 2007 in an election that the State Department termed “open, peaceful, and highly competitive.” However, Wade’s reputation has since been marred by his increasingly unilateral exercise of power, along with reports of rising corruption, nepotism, and restrictions on civil liberties. The president, who is in his 80s, has announced plans to run for a third term in 2012, which may require a constitutional amendment. Public unrest has escalated over government policies and stagnant living conditions, and in March 2011, the government accused a group of opposition and civil society activists of organizing a coup attempt. Opposition groups rejected the allegations as politically motivated. Violence has also increased in Casamance since mid-2009, despite the previously successful 2004 peace deal.
The State Department refers to U.S.-Senegalese relations as “excellent,” while noting concerns over negative governance trends. Bilateral engagement has increased in recent years, in part due to Senegal’s identity as a moderate, pro-Western Muslim country in a region affected by violent extremism. U.S. foreign assistance focuses on democratic governance, economic growth, rural development, public health, food security, reconciliation in Casamance, and military professionalism. The United States also sees Senegal as an anchor of regional stability and a potential partner in combating transnational security threats, such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and maritime piracy. Senegal is a significant contributor of troops to international peacekeeping missions, and thousands of Senegalese peacekeepers have received U.S. training through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.
Bilateral aid through State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) accounts has increased steeply in recent years, from $57.8 million in FY2008 to $106.3 million in FY2010. The Obama Administration has requested $119.9 million for FY2012, and Senegal is expected to be one of 13 African focus countries for the Administration’s new global food security initiative, Feed the Future. In addition, a $540 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact was signed in 2009.
Congress may play a role in guiding U.S. policy toward Senegal through its authorization, appropriation, and oversight of foreign assistance, security cooperation programs, and executive branch policies. Some Members of Congress, for example, have expressed concern over the decision to award Senegal an MCC compact in light of recent governance trends.
Date of Report: March 25, 2011
Number of Pages: 23
Order Number: R41369
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Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Côte d’Ivoire has entered a renewed period of extreme political instability following a contested presidential election designed to cap an often forestalled peace process. The election was held under the terms of the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the most recent in a series of partially implemented peace accords aimed at reunifying Côte d’Ivoire, which has remained largely divided between a government-controlled southern region and a rebel-controlled zone in the north since the outbreak of a civil war in 2002. In the past week, a renewed rebel offensive captured key towns in western and central Côte d’Ivoire, including the administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, and there was intense fighting in Abidjan, the commercial capital and government stronghold. On April 4, French forces seized control of the Abidjan airport, and French troops and international peacekeepers fired on government targets. These actions were defended as necessary to enable evacuations of foreigners and the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.
The renewed conflict directly threatens long-standing U.S. and international efforts to support a transition to peace, political stability, and democratic governance in Côte d’Ivoire. Indirectly at stake are broader, long-term U.S. efforts and billions of dollars in assistance to ensure regional stability, peace, democratic and accountable governance, and economic growth in West Africa. The United States has supported the Ivoirian peace process, both diplomatically and financially, with funding appropriated by Congress. It supports the ongoing U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); funded a UNOCI predecessor, the U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire; and assisted in the deployment in 2003 of a now defunct Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force. The 112th Congress may be asked to consider additional funding for UNOCI; U.S. support for a potential ECOWAS military intervention force; or new funding for emergency humanitarian aid in response to the deteriorating political-military situation.
On November 28, 2010, a presidential election runoff vote was held between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the two leading winners of a first-round poll a month earlier. Both claim to have won the runoff and separately inaugurated themselves as president and formed rival governments. Ouattara bases his victory claim on the U.N.-certified runoff results announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). These show that he won the election with a 54.1% share of votes, against 45.9% for Gbagbo. The international community, including the United States, endorsed the IECannounced poll results as legitimate and demanded that Gbagbo cede the presidency to Ouattara. Gbagbo, rejecting the IEC decision, appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which annulled it and proclaimed Gbagbo president, with 51.5% of votes against 48.6% for Ouattara. Gbagbo therefore claims to have been duly elected and refuses to hand power over to Ouattara.
The electoral standoff has caused a sharp rise in violence, human rights abuses, and attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. The international community has broadly rejected Gbagbo’s victory claim and endorsed Ouattara as the legally elected president. It is using diplomatic and financial efforts, sanctions, and a military intervention threat to pressure Gbagbo to step aside. H.Res. 85 (Payne), introduced on February 10, 2011, would express congressional support for such ends. Top U.S officials have also attempted to directly pressure Gbagbo to step down. An existing U.S. ban on bilateral aid was augmented with visa restrictions and financial sanctions targeting the Gbagbo administration. As of early 2011, regional mediation had produced few results; non-military efforts may be superseded by the rebels’ renewed attempt to oust Gbagbo by force. Continued political volatility was likely under most current scenarios. A unity government might temporarily reduce political tension, but would likely not resolve the root causes of the crisis.
Date of Report: April 5, 2011
Number of Pages: 79
Order Number: RS21989
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Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources, and mounting concern over violent extremist activities and other potential threats posed by under-governed spaces, such as maritime piracy and illicit trafficking. In addition, there is ongoing concern for Africa’s many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander. Congress has closely monitored the command since its establishment.
On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM, to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM’s establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008.
DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. The command will operate from Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future. DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent. The East African country of Djibouti, home to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonnier, provides the U.S. military’s only enduring infrastructure in Africa.
As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen regional stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises. In March 2011, AFRICOM commenced Operation Odyssey Dawn to protect civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 1973.
The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa and more recent attacks have highlighted the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have created vast under-governed spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist groups may train and operate. The upsurge in piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa has been directly attributed to ongoing instability in Somalia. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa’s exports of crude oil to the United States are now roughly equal to those of the Middle East, further emphasizing the continent’s strategic importance. This report provides a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of AFRICOM. A discussion of AFRICOM’s mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing and manpower requirements is included.
Date of Report: March 22, 2011
Number of Pages: 43
Order Number: RL34003
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Christopher M. Blanchard
Acting Section Research Manager
Over forty years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry in February and early March 2011, and a stalemate began to break in favor of the Qadhafi government, threatening civilians in opposition-held areas. The United States and other European and Arab states are now carrying out military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17 and authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid the dismantling of his military. His supporters have threatened to respond to foreign attacks by striking civilian and military targets in the Mediterranean region.
Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26, “while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” As of the morning of March 24, U.S. military officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi’s military to control the country’s airspace and were increasingly focused on targeting pro-Qadhafi ground forces found to be continuing to violate Resolution 1973 through attacks on Libyan civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces and has called for Qadhafi to step down. The no-fly zone called for in Resolution 1973 is in place and negotiations over future coalition command arrangements continue. The United States and international partners are providing humanitarian assistance to thousands who have fled Libya and remain in temporary camps in Tunisia and Egypt.Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of reengagement toward Qadhafi after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. President Obama now has joined some leaders in asserting that Muammar al Qadhafi must ultimately give up power, although that outcome is not called for explicitly in Resolution 1973. Obama Administration officials highlight a number of non-military steps the U.S. government has taken to achieve that objective, while military operations to protect Libyan civilians continue. U.S. steps include new targeted sanctions established in Executive Order 13566. Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force. Some executive-legislative consultation occurred prior to the start of U.S. military operations, and, on March 21, President Obama sent a letter to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization.
Many observers believe that Libya’s weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council which claims to represent all areas of the country and is seeking recognition and material support. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential consequences of the military action under way and other policy proposals under consideration.
Date of Report: March 24, 2011
Number of Pages: 33
Order Number: RL33142
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
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