Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important
regional ally, as a partner in counterterrorism, and as a free trade
counterpart. Morocco receives substantial U.S. development aid, and
bilateral trade and investment have increased following a 2006 Free Trade Agreement.
Morocco benefits from U.S. security assistance and military cooperation, and is
a purchaser of U.S. defense articles, including F-16 jets. New emphasis
may be placed on the U.S.- Morocco relationship amid regional turmoil and
growing terrorist threats emanating from neighboring states in North
Africa and the nearby Sahel region of West Africa.
King Mohammed VI, who inherited the Moroccan throne in 1999, retains supreme
political power but has taken some liberalizing steps. In 2011, amid popular
demonstrations that echoed unrest elsewhere in the region, the king
proposed a new constitution that, if fully implemented, could strengthen
the legislature, judiciary, and local-level government. It nonetheless
preserves the king’s role as an arbiter of political decision-making, head
of the military, and the country’s highest religious authority. The
constitution was adopted in a public referendum in July 2011, but the
implementation process has been slow and opaque. Legislative elections held in
2011, under the new constitution, brought an Islamist political party, the
Justice and Development Party (PJD), to power for the first time. The PJD
has sought to bolster the power of elected officials and to institute
economic and governance reforms. However, the party has faced challenges in transitioning
from an outsider opposition role to the day-to-day responsibility of
policymaking. It has also struggled to overcome tensions with pro-palace
elites, as well as with nominal allies. Protests have dwindled since their
apogee in 2011, but sporadic demonstrations continue over economic and
social grievances, while some continue to call for deeper political changes.
Obama Administration officials have expressed strong support for the Moroccan
monarchy, while also encouraging political reforms and occasionally
voicing human rights concerns. Despite longterm, warm ties, the
U.S.-Morocco relationship was briefly troubled in April 2013 by U.S. support
at the U.N. Security Council for U.N. human rights monitoring in the disputed
territory of Western Sahara. Morocco administers most of Western Sahara
and considers it an integral part of its sovereign territory. The United
States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim to the region, nor the
self-declared independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is
backed and hosted by Algeria. The region’s status remains subject to U.N.
mediation efforts. (See CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis
Arieff.) Relevant draft legislation includes H.R. 2855 and S. 1372.
Morocco’s foreign policy focuses on its Western partners (especially France,
Spain, the European Union, and the United States); the Middle East; and,
to some extent, francophone Africa. Morocco is also completing a two-year
stint as a rotating member of the U.N. Security Council. Neighboring
Algeria is a regional rival and supports independence for Western Sahara.
Friction over the Western Sahara issue has stymied Moroccan-Algerian
relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union (Morocco withdrew in
1984 over recognition of Western Sahara), and regional economic and
security cooperation.
Date of Report: October 18, 2013
Number of Pages: 20
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Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
The U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic
partner and anchor state in East Africa, and as critical to
counterterrorism efforts in the region. Kenya has repeatedly been a target of
terrorist attacks, and, as the September 2013 attack on an upscale Nairobi
shopping mall underscores, terrorist threats against international and
domestic targets in Kenya remain a serious concern.
Kenya’s military plays a key role in regional operations against Al Shabaab in
Somalia. The Al Qaeda-affiliated Somali insurgent group has claimed
responsibility for the Westgate Mall attack ostensibly in response to
Kenya’s military offensive against the group across the Somali border. The
incident is the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since the 1998 U.S. Embassy
bombing and the group’s first successful large-scale operation in the
Kenyan capital.
Kenya ranks among the top U.S. foreign aid recipients in the world, receiving
significant development, humanitarian, and security assistance in recent
years. The country, which is a top recipient of police and military
counterterrorism assistance on the continent, hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic
mission in Africa. Nairobi is home to one of four major United Nations offices worldwide.
The election in March 2013 of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President
William Ruto complicates the historically strong relationship between Kenya
and the United States. Kenyatta, whose victory against former Prime
Minister Raila Odinga was deemed credible by most observers, and Ruto face
charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged role
in crimes against humanity during violence that followed Kenya’s last elections
in December 2007.
Ruto’s ICC trial commenced in September 2013; Kenyatta’s begins in November.
Their supporters have portrayed the cases as part of an international
conspiracy against Kenya, and as emblematic of racial bias on the part of
a court that has, to date, exclusively targeted Africans for prosecution.
This was a campaign message during the 2013 elections, in which voting largely followed
ethnic lines. The September vote by Kenya’s parliament to withdraw from the
Rome Statute of the ICC does not affect the current trials and is, for
now, largely symbolic.
Kenya’s key aid donors and senior Obama Administration officials have been
supportive of the ICC process for the country, viewing impunity for state
corruption and political violence as a major challenge that continues to
threaten Kenya’s long-term stability. Implications for U.S. relations,
assistance, and future cooperation remain unclear, given that the United States
is not a state party to the ICC. This may be a key issue for Congress in
the coming months, as it weighs various governance, human rights, and
security priorities in the country.
The 2007-2008 post-election violence tarnished Kenya’s generally peaceful
reputation and had a significant impact on its economy, which is East
Africa’s largest and most diverse. More recent developments, including the
September 2013 terrorist attack and a fire in August that did extensive
damage to Nairobi’s airport, the region’s busiest, may again slow economic
growth.
The March elections were the first held under a new constitution, under which
major political reforms are proscribed. The Kenyatta government faces high
expectations by the electorate to improve the economy and deliver on
pledged political and social reforms.
Date of Report: September 23, 2013
Number of Pages: 22
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Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
On September 21, 2013, masked gunmen attacked the upscale Westgate shopping
mall in Nairobi, Kenya, taking hostages and killing more than 60 people.1 Almost 200 people,
including at least 5 U.S. citizens, were wounded in the siege, which
lasted four days. The attack is the most deadly terrorist incident in
Kenya since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.2 A Somali Islamist
insurgent group, Al Shabaab, which has ties to Al Qaeda, has
claimed responsibility for the Westgate attack.
Al Qaeda and affiliated groups like Al Shabaab have had a presence in East
Africa for almost 20 years, although the extent of their operations there
has varied over time. The region’s porous borders, proximity to the
Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions,
and pervasive corruption, combined with almost 20 years of state collapse
in neighboring Somalia, have provided an enabling environment for violent
extremist groups.
The Westgate mall attack comes almost two years after Kenya launched a military
offensive across its northeastern border with Somalia, with the stated aim
of defending itself against terrorist threats and incursions by Al
Shabaab. Kenya subsequently joined the U.N.-mandated African Union
stabilization mission, AMISOM, which is tasked with countering the threat
posed by Al Shabaab in Somalia. Al Shabaab’s attack on the mall comes
three years after an Al Shabaab cell conducted the group’s first
successful attack outside Somalia with deadly bombings in Kampala, Uganda,
in retaliation for Uganda’s role as a leading AMISOM troop contributor.3 Al Shabaab has
repeatedly threatened countries contributing to the regional operation,
and spokesmen for the group have cited Kenya’s ongoing military role in
Somalia as justification for the Westgate attack.4 While Kenyan officials thus
far have maintained commitment to AMISOM in the siege’s aftermath, the
attack may deter other countries from contributing troops in response to a
call from the U.N. envoy for Somalia for more military support to counter Al
Shabaab.
In the 15 years since the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Congress has
appropriated increasing counterterrorism funding for Africa, and has
focused hearings and investigations on reported support provided by U.S.
citizens to Al Shabaab. The United States is a major contributor of
financial and in-kind support to AMISOM, and has provided its troop
contributors and other countries in the region with substantial support to
counter terrorist threats. “We are in this fight together,” the U.S.
ambassador to Kenya commented as Federal Bureau of Investigation forensic
teams deployed after the Westgate attack. President Obama has pledged U.S.
support to bring those responsible for the attack to justice.5 Political instability and
terrorist activities in and emanating from Somalia are subject to ongoing
interest by policymakers, who remain concerned about Al Shabaab’s ties to
Al Qaeda and affiliated groups and its use of Somalia as a staging ground
for attacks in the region and a training ground for foreign fighters. The
following sections address possible questions about the attack and related
issues for Congress.
Date of Report: September 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 13
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